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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect a
decrease in the rental rate for storage units?

II.

Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the Plaintiff
for Defendant's failure to pay the full amount of rent in
accordance with law?

III.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the postjudgment actions of the Trial Court, and if so, were such
actions in accordance with law?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE APPELLANT'S REPLY
BRIEF AS FOLLOWS:
Utah Judicial Code section 38-8-3
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-2
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-36-2(1)
Constitution of Utah Art. I, Sec. 11
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A purported mistake on an unsigned reminder notice does effect
a decrease in the rental rate for storage units, the remedies taken
by and afforded to the Plaintiff for the alleged Defendant's failure
to pay the full amount of rent were not in accordance with law, and
finally, this Court does have jurisdiction to review the postjudgment
actions of the Trial Court, and the actions followed were not in
accordance with law.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
A PURPORTED MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES EFFECT
A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS WHEN RELIED UPON BY
-1-

THE APPELLANT IN SUBMITTING AS REQUESTEDf BY THE RESPONDENT'S DULY
AUTHORIZED AGENT WITH APPARENT AUTHORITY, THE TIMELY FULL PAYMENTS
OP RENT EITHER IN CASH (APP-4 AND 7) OR THE APPROPRIATE MONTHLY
AMORTIZATIONS OP THE APPELLANT'S APPROPRIATE COUNTERCLAIM LIEN FOR
TROVER AND CONVERSION OF HIS BUSINESS PROPERTY (APP-16, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, AND 27) WHICH WAS RECOGNIZED, RECEIVED AND
ACCEPTED; BY THE RESPONDENT'S DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT WITH APPARENT
AUTHORITY, RENDERING FULL AND TIMELY PAYMENT ENJOYMENT, AS REQUESTED.
To fully understand the Respondent's defense of a purported
"MISTAKE" an issue of material fact, and the asserted premise from
which they stand in requesting this Court to affirm a Summary
Judgment and to enforce the Respondent's entitlement for reformation
of the contract, to a previous rent-rate in violation of the
contractual notification requirements/ and to enforce reformation of
the Respondent's omitted language in the written signed contract as
to the notification requirements/ a required threshold, prior to
becoming effective, for rent-rate decreases one must import fault
upon:
Either the Appellant, who was required to sign the Rental
Agreement dated June 12, 1987, (App-42) as a condition of
renting the Respondent's storage units Nos. 143 and 144,
or the Respondent who properly noticed the Appellant for
the appropriate rent-rate decreases to be effective May 1,
1988 (App-4) and to be effective retroactive for the month
of October 1988 and to commence on a going forward basis
from November 1, 1988 (App-17),
for the responsibility of the purported alleged mistake and the
Respondent's ignorance of their contractual duties of responsibility,
set forth in their own required-to-be-signed Rental Agreement. Some
noted authorities have stated:
"Reformation will not be decreed unless the facts required
for such a decree are proved convincingly and to the entire
satisfaction of the Court. A mere preponderance of the
evidence is said not to be enough."
Professor Corbin on Contracts, Chapter 29 1 615, page 743.
"The authorities all require that parol evidence of a
mistake in a written contract must be most clear and
-2-

convincing.
The language of some of the cases is 'the
strongest possible1. Courts of equity do not grant the
remedy of reformation upon a probability, nor even upon a
mere preponderance of evidence, but only upon a certainty
of error.H
Dougherty v. Lion Fire Ins. Co,, 84 N.Y.S. 10 (New York 1903).
H

The mistake of which a party to a written contract may be
heard to complain in equity can arise in only one of three
ways:
First, it may be a mistake of law,
Second, it may be a mistake entertained by the Plaintiff
with the knowledge of the Defendant arising under
circumstances which impose the duty upon the Defendant to
correct the Plaintiff's error. Defendant's failure to do
so is itself a species of fraud and is treated as fraud,
Third, species of mistake is . . . when through fraud,
mistake, or accident a written contract fails to express
the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be
regarded, and
the erroneous parts of the writing
disregarded."
Moreno Mut. IRR. Co. v. Beaumont IRR. Dist., 211 P.2d 937, 938 (Cal.
1949).
Applying these rules to the case at bar, no mistake of law is
claimed.

The second, the Respondent's claim

in the Attorney's

prepared and canned Affidavit of Ms. Audrey Hooper dated April 29,
1989, par. Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 (App-5 and 5A) that a mistake was made
proclaiming knowledge to the Appellant, wherein the Appellant would
be required, or through a court-ordered imposition of a duty upon the
Appellant

to correct

the Respondent's

error.

The Respondent's

affiant Ms. Audrey Hooper Deposition taken dated April 29, 1989,
clearly controverts and declares under oath just the opposite to her
Attorney's prepared and canned Affidavit of the same day, at the same
time, by the same person. (App-6 and 6A) which states that:
Lines:
24.

Q.

You did not talk to Mr. Echols personally?

-3-

25.

A.

No, I did not.

8.

Q.

Did you talk to him after that time?

9.

A.

No I never actually talked to him.

He would

10.

send me letters . . . but I don't recall him

11.

coming in.

12.

Q.

Personally?

13.

A.

No.

Or by phone?

No.

"As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition is
generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the truth
than an affidavit, since a deponent is subject to crossexamination and an affiant is not • • • The rule that a
party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that
contradicts his deposition to create an issue of fact on
a motion for summary judgment does not apply when there is
some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony
was in error for reasons that appear in the deposition or
the party-deponent is able to state in his affidavit an
adequate explanation for the contradictory answer in his
deposition."
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah 1983).
Applying these rules to the case at bar the affiant, Ms. Audrey
Hooper, asserts knowledge to the Appellant, which did not exist, (R
at 70 par. No. 4 ) .

Therefore, the Attorney's prepared and canned

Affidavit, notarized by himself, a beneficiary to the fraud, (App5 and 5A) was submitted and filed with the Trial Court instead of the
Deposition of the same day; since the scheduled Deposition dated
April 29, 1989, (R at 55) and (R at 54) did not come out the way he
envisioned, or expected it to be (R at 50) and (R at 46 P.2 par. 3 ) .
This is a clear and precise act of fraud against the Appellant, See
7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law, U 43 "for knowingly allowing a witness
to give perjured testimony without informing the court of the fact."
A case in point which should apply to the case at bar states:
"An attorney is never justified in continuing a case after
he has knowledge of the fact that it is being supported by
-4-

perjured testimony; and if he proceeds with the trial
thereafter, without acquainting the court of the fact that
the testimony is false and seeks to recover judgment on
such testimony, his misconduct merits disbarment."
In RE King, 322 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1958).
Furthermore,

the

Affidavit

makes

no

explanation

for

the

inconsistencies declared in the Deposition at the same time, by the
same person, on the same day, whereby the Respondent complains of a
"mistake,11 which does not exist, (R at 70 par. No.4).

Therefore,

the Deposition is a more accurate means of truth, and the Attorney's
prepared and canned Affidavit notarized by himself, a beneficiary to
the fraud, renders no value or support to this case, only

the

absolute proof of fraud by the Respondent, against the Appellant.
There you have it, the Respondent's manufactured fraud, the prepared
and canned Affidavit dated April 29, 1989, (App-5 and 5A) with its
supporting
return

canned and manufactured

receipt, undated, purporting

letter

uncertified

to render

without a

knowledge

to the

Appellant (R at 56) for the purpose of alleging mistake to accomplish
wrongful eviction, wrongful attachment, and wrongful possession of
the Appellant's, his spouse's and his children's property in direct
retaliation, directly resulting from the Appellant's letters (App-3,
8, 9, 10, and 13). Further discussion on letters and knowledge can
be reviewed on (R at 50), Deposition pages 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36,
which clearly shows that the Appellant was not under any duty for
lack of knowledge purported by the Respondent's asserted claim of
"mistake."

Furthermore, the Respondent proclaims (R at 46 p. No. 1,

par. No. 3) referring to the Appellant's objection (R at 50 par. 13),
"said objection contains examples of immaterial issues,N whereby the
Respondent confirms for lack of proper objection that $40 per month

-5-

for both units was appropriately reduced by the duly authorized agent
with apparent authority, and no alleged mistake exists. Therefore,
reformation must not be granted, during the review process in
affirming the Trial Court's Summary Judgment, which was granted in
violation of the contractual notification requirements.

Finally,

the third is the intention grounds elaborated in length by the
Respondent in his brief which does not apply in this case, under the
exception as italicized. 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts^* £ 135,
144 pages 486-487, and 499, states the doctrine as follows:
"Where a party enters into a contract ignorant of a fact
but meaning to waive all inquiry into it, or waives an
investigation after attention has been called to it, there
is no mistake in the legal sense. Moreover, mere ignorance
of the facts is not necessarily a ground for relief, nor
will the courts relieve one from the consequences of his
own improvidence or poor judgment. Parties must exercise
ordinary diligence in the execution of contracts and are
chargeable with such knowledge as diligence would have
disclosed and may not avoid a contract [Notification
Requirements for rent-rate increases] on the basis of
mistake where it appears that ignorance of the facts was
the result of carelessness, indifference, or inattention."
Moreno Mut. IRR. Co. v. Beaumont IRR. Dist., 211 P.2d 937, 938 (Cal
1949).

Applying this rule to the case at bar the Appellant's

documents (App-3, 8, 9, and 10) without any response, "just put the
copies into the file," (App-6A lines 20 and 21) and the Appellant's
responses (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) without
any response renders the Respondent's asserted claim of "Mistake" to
no mistake in the legal sense. Therefore, no reformation is entitled
and, of course, no alleged default exists for the period of time May
1988 through September 10, 1988, during this period of time the
Appellant's rent-paid storage units were locked up.

Consequently,

appropriate damages are now clearly visible, as a matter of law, for
trover and conversion of the Appellant's business property; hence,
-6-

the

proper

entitlement

of

damages

for

the Appellant

from

the

Respondent, pursuant to the Appellant's properly filed counterclaim
(R at 69). Furthermore, no purported default exists for the period
of time October 1988 through July 1989, as claimed by the Respondent,
directly resulting from the appropriate Appellant's lien that was
timely and appropriately amortized to off-set the current legal rents
at the properly notified amount.
Other noted authorities not in conflict with any of the cited
authorities on this issue of mistake as previously discussed and
cited above are as cited below.
McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 506 (Utah 1952).
Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 1950).
Hence

there

Respondent's

is

no

asserted

mistake
claim

of

in

the

legal

sense,

contractual

and

and

the

statutory

justification for locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit
facilities is an act of fraud that was relied upon by the Trial Court
in granting the Summary Judgment against the Appellant for which
great damage has been suffered, is being suffered and may continue
to be suffered by the Appellant if action is not taken immediately,
in the Appellant's behalf.
In Summary, the Respondent as of July 1989 was only entitled to
$400 in cash that amount had already been subtracted from the amount
of cash owing to the Appellant where he was to receive $5,830.50, see
(App-27).

Consequently,

the asserted

fraudulent

claims by

the

Respondent, in selling all of the Appellant's remaining property,
personal

records,

spouse's

and

children's

property

whereby

replacement value is near $100,000 for the purported sum of $2,300
is an act of fraud, for which they must be held accountable!
-7-

Will

this Court do that?
ISSUE II
THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE
ALLEGED DEPENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE PULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE NOT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The Respondent has brought to the forefront the Utah Code
Section 38-8-3 claiming protection on the asserted premise that there
is an established default by the Appellant reiterated many times
throughout their proclamated claim and Motion for Summary Judgment
(R at 56 par. 16, 23, and 30) which specifically describes landlord's
statutory duties of responsibility that must be followed prior to any
enforcement

action

against

the

tenant, which

is

specifically

described in Utah Code section 38-8-2:
••Before taking enforcement action under Section 38-8-3,
the owner shall determine if a financing statement filed
in accordance with Section 70A-9-401, et seq. has been
filed with the Division of Corporation and Commercial Code
concerning the property to be sold or otherwise disposed
of."
No place in the record is there any compliance with this
statutory duty of responsibility by the landlord as asserted by the
affiant Mr. Steven J. Nelson Affidavit par. 6 (App-14A) and notarized
by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud, for the period of time
May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period of the
Appellant's lock-up or any other period of time prior to commencement
of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20, 1989.
Utah Code Section 38-8-3(2) states:
"After the occupant has been in default continuously for
a period of 30 days, the owner may begin enforcement action
if the occupant has been given notice in writing. The
notice shall be delivered in person or sent by certified
mail to the last known address of the occupant, and a copy
of the notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the
sheriff of the county where the self-service storage
-8-

facility is located."
No place

in the record

is there any compliance with

this

statutory duty of responsibility by the landlord as asserted by the
affiant, Mr. Steven

J.

Nelson, Affidavit

notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary
asserted

by

par. 6

(App-14A) and

to the fraud; further

the affiant, Ms. Audrey Hooper

(App-5 and

5A) and

notarized by her Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud; for the period
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period
of the Appellant's lock-up, or any other period of time prior to the
commencement of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20,1989.
The Utah Code Section 38-8-3(3) states:
H

This notice shall include:

(a) An itemized statement of the owner's claim showing
the sum due at the time of the notice and the date when
the sum became due;
(b) A brief and general description of the personal
property subject to the lien, which description shall be
reasonably adequate to permit the person notified to
identify the property; except that any container including,
but not limited to, a trunk, valise, or box that is locked,
fastened, sealed, or tied in a manner which deters
immediate access to its contents may be described as such
without describing its contents;
(c) A notification of denial of access to the personal
property, if such denial is permitted under the terms of
the rental agreement, which notification shall provide the
name, street, address, and telephone number of the owner
or his designated agent whom the occupant may contact to
respond to the notification;
(d) A demand for payment within a specified time not less
than 15 days after delivery of the notice; and
(e) A conspicuous statement that, unless the claim is paid
within the time stated in the notice, the personal property
will be advertised for sale or other disposition and will
be sold or otherwise disposed of at the specified time and
place•"
No place

in the record

is there any compliance with

-9-

this

statutory duty of responsibility by the landlord as asserted by the
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, Affidavit par. 6 (App-14A) and
notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud for the period
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period
of the Appellant's lock-up or any other period of time prior to
commencement of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20, 1989.
The law in Utah is well established on issues of fact asserted
by affiants in their Affidavits utilized to support Summary Judgments
as previously cited and pointed out above by the Respondent's
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson's wild-eyed, bald assertion par. 6
(App-14A), and notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud.
"The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without
a proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion
is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary
judgment motion."
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1983).
Consequently, the false and fraudulent asserted claims, by this
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, and his subordinate counterpart, Ms.
Audrey Hooper, are a mere pretext for the utilization and the
application of the law in their favor, for which enforcement action
entitlement is not available, since the Respondent did not follow the
appropriate statutory prerequisites to enforcement, required as
statutory duties of responsibility, but took the law into their own
hands persistently, violating the tenant's rights, to undisturbed
access, the landlord's implied covenant.
The only possible claim that may be construed to be in some
compliance would be (App-8A and 8B) attached to (App-8) and (App-7,
for June 1988) which was recognized, received and accepted at the
properly notified rent-rate of $55 per month for both units, thereby
-10-

waiving any rights to claim default.

The case at bar, should apply

the law, as stated in Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain,
560 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1977).
"Where by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease
becomes [in default], the lessor is entitled to recover
possession.
He waives that right by the acceptance of
rent. He cannot accept the rent, and at the same time
claim a [default] of the lease.H
The rate of rent was clearly established in May 1988 (App-4 and
4A) and then confirmed in June 1988 (App-7 and 8) by the acceptance
of the appropriate amount of rent, per the terms and conditions of
the Rental Agreement.
The Appellant fails to comprehend the logical reasoning, i.e.
the Appellant's failure to pay the full amount of rent;
therefore, all his remaining assets, his spouse's assets,
and his children's assets are to be seized and sold for
the enforcement of the local verbal telephone "Cartel" then
the Appellant is to be placed in jail until they get more!
on the asserted premise of default, or any authority of any kind in
asserting as claimed by the Respondent that they had a contractual
and statutory

right to deny access to the Appellant's rent-paid

storage units beginning in May 1988 through September 10, 1988, in
direct violation of the landlord's implied covenant to undisturbed
access

when

Agreement.

accepting

the

full

rental payments per

the Rental

This is an unconscionable claim by the Respondent, which

must not be affirmed.
The Appellant was wrongfully
intimidation,

extortion,

self-help

subjected
remedies

to economic duress,
to

the

Appellant's

property as asserted in the properly filed counterclaim (R at 69) by
the Respondent, in direct violation of the Utah Judicial Code 7836-2(1) Forcible Detainer (App-31A) which states:
"Every person is guilty of forcible detainer who by force,

or by menaces and threats of violencey unlawfully holds and
keeps the possession of any real property whether the same
was acquired peaceably or otherwise."
A similar case in point which should apply to the case at bar
states:
H

There is no question under Dtah cases that a violation of
the duty set by the statutes gives rise to an action for
damages, not in an action under the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statutes but as a separate tort."
King

v. Firm, 285 P.2d

1118

(Utah 1955).

Consequently, the

Appellant's properly filed counterclaim for trover and conversion,
the establishment of the Appellant's lien, should not be dismissed
with prejudice (R at 69). Since there was no mistake in the legal
sense, nor is there any default as asserted by the Respondent's in
locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, for the period
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, nor is there any default
for the period of time October 1988 through July 1989 resulting from
the

Appellant's

amortizations.

appropriate

counterclaim—Appellant's

lien

Therefore, the self-help remedies taken by and

afforded to the Plaintiff for the alleged Defendant's failure to pay
the full amount of rent were not in accordance with law, and must not
be affirmed in the Respondent's adamant request for Summary Judgment
affirmance.
ISSUE III
THIS CODRT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE POSTJUDGMENT
ACTIONS OP THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE ACTIONS FOLLOWED WERE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The Respondent asserts and cites the Utah Court of Appeals order
dated November 1, 1989 which states:
"Furthermore, proceedings occurring subsequent to the final
order being appealed are outside the scope of the issues
on appeal, a defect which cannot be cured by amendment of
-12-

the docketing statement filed in this appeal.11
The Respondent further asserts and complains that this court
does not have jurisdiction citing Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641, P.2d 142
(Utah 1982) which states:
"The final judgment rules does not preclude review of
post judgment orders. Such orders are independently subject
to the test of finality, according to their own substance
and effect."
This case does not limit any jurisdiction of this court for the
review of postjudgment actions taken by the Respondent

for the

unlawful collection of $400 in cash, commingled with several blatant
violations of U.S. and State of Utah Constitutional and statutory
rights, maliciously ignored by the Respondent and the Trial Court in
the professed lawful required enforcement action.
Next, the Respondent asserts the case State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d
521

(Utah

App.

1989) declaring

summary

dismissal

for

lack

of

jurisdiction is appropriate.
In reply to each of the Respondent's asserted arguments, self
serving claims, to thwart accountability, the Appellant respectfully
states:

the Notice of Appeal dated July 20, 1989, the motion for

Extraordinary Writ, case No. 890455 dated July 21, 1989, the notice
of property bond dated July 21, 1989, all served prior to the sale
of the Appellant's, his spouse's and his children's property (App1) and (App-40) the Utah Court of Appeals Order dated July 25, 1989,
conveyed by telephone just minutes before the scheduled sale and
execution on July 25, 1989, during which time the Appellant was under
severe emotional distress states:
"The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied.
Petitioner William L. Echols has an adequate and sufficient
remedy for any alleged error by way of an appeal and
posting a supersedeas bond.11

I guess for someone with a lot of money this may be OK, but what
about

the impoverished, impecunious, Pro-Se litigant, with his

remaining life's possessions, who has had his business property
unlawfully locked up for in excess of five (5) months, and the vital
spare parts and repair manual inside unaccounted for, no property
accounting if still there after the self-help remedies taken during
the

Appellant's

counterclaim?

published

absence.

Who

cares?

What

is a

Do tenant's have any rights? What is the purpose of

White v. District Court of Utah County?
The Utah Court of Appeals in Order dated August 1, 1989,
referring

to

the

Appellant's

motion

to

"Amend

Appellant's

Counterclaim" states:
"Said motion is hereby denied and all issues are reserved
for plenary consideration of the appeal."
OK, the court wants to look at the whole picture before they make a
final judgment.

The Appellant can go along with that, so let's do

it; look at the whole case including the Appellant's Amended Record
on Appeal.
The Respondent proclaims in his response (dated July 27, 1989),
to the Appellant's motions utilized in the order cited above, i.e.,
August 1, 1989, "respondent requests notice thereof so that an
appropriate response may be filed addressing the issues raised." OK,
give the Respondent a voice in the decision process.
The Appellant's motion to the Utah Court of Appeals Objection
to Motion to Enforce Order Re: Bond and to Dismiss dated November 9,
1989, is self explanatory, mentioning Exempt Property 1
The Respondent proclaims in response, opposition to Appellant's
Motion for Property Accounting and to Amend Docketing Statement and
-14-

Request for Relief dated November 17, 1989, stating:
"If for any
[reason] the Court should deem any
reconsideration appropriate, American respectfully requests
the opportunity to address the merits more fully."
whatever the Respondent wanted to say to correct, if necessary, the
Appellant's amended correct record on Appeal, it was availed to him
and properly served pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals Rule No.
11(h)

dated

November

20,

1989, and

properly

included

in

the

Appellant's Brief file dated December 19, 1989.
The Appellant properly filed in a timely manner November 21,
1989, his objection to the Respondent's Response Amended Docketing
Statement and Request for Relief dated November 17, 1989.
The Utah Court of Appeals immediately filed November 23, 1989,
received

November

28, 1989, the Appellant's

briefing

schedule,

without ruling on each of the following:
(A) Respondent's Motion to Enforce Order Re:
dated November 3, 1989.

Bond

(B) Appellant's Objection to Motion to Enforce Order
Re: Bond dated November 9, 1989.
(C) Appellant's Objection to Respondent's Response
Amended Docketing Statement and Request for Relief,
dated November 21, 1989.
Consequently, the Appellant included in his Brief filed December 19,
1989, the entire case, including the Appellant's amended correct
record on Appeal; a U.S. Federal Court required prerequisite of U.S.
Constitutional questions in state appellate court, prior to Federal
Review, a case in point states that:
"According to Daye, Supra, at 196, if a defendant cites to
cases which concern one's constitutional right to a fair
trial, the state court is on notice of the defendant's
constitutional claims."
Nelson v. Jones, 573 F. Supp. 1138 (U.S.D.C.S.D. New York 1983).
-15-

This Court is hereby duly noticed as stated in the Appellant's
Amended Docketing Statement dated November 16, 1989f the appropriate
and correct record on appeal pursuant to Utah Court of Appeals Rule
No. 11(h) file dated November 20# 1989/ as to violations against the
Appellant's

Constitutional

Rights

including

but

not

limited

to

unlawful incarceration discussed in the Appellant's Brief and the
appropriate Appellant's Amended Docketing Statement as described.
Moreover, the Respondent as requested utilized his ability to object
or

respond

in

any

way

he

saw

appropriate

in

correcting

the

Appellant's record on appeal and controverting the Appellant's valid
claims.

Now he has done so!

The Appellant now applies the "Writ of Coram Nobis" to this
Court in bringing the matters described in the Appellant's Amended
Docketing Statement dated November 16, 1989f and the Appellant's
unchallenged correct record on appeal dated November 2 0 , 1989, in
proper compliance with any jurisdictional questions raised by the
Respondent/

in

his

self

serving

objections

to

thwart

any

accountability for violations of the Appellant/ his spouse's and his
children's U.S. and State of Utah Constitutional rights/ clearly
violated in his malicious attempt too cover up his fraud and deceit
utilized in obtaining the Summary Judgment and the inappropriate/
unlawful

enforcement

actions

accountability must be made.

against

the

Appellant/

for

which

An appropriate case in point which

should apply to the case at bar states:
"The effort to upset this conviction in this manner must
be considered in connection with our rules of procedure.
When an accused is convicted of a crime, our law requires
that any claimed error or defect be corrected by a regular
appeal within the time allowed by law, and if this is not
done the judgment becomes final . . • [Exception clause
-16-

which should apply] only when the interests of justice so
demand because of some extraordinary circumstance or
exigency: e.g. lack of jurisdiction, mistaken identity,
where the requirement of law have been so ignored or
distorted that the accused has been deprived of 'due
process of law1 or there is shown to exist some other such
circumstance that it would be unconscionable not to review
the conviction.11
Sullivan v, Turner, 448 P.2d 908, 909 (Utah 1968).
Furthermore, the Appellant, a Utah County "jail bird" at the
demand of the Respondent, and the malicious retaliatory endorsement
of the Trial Court during the properly noticed Oral Arguments hereby
invokes

his

considerations

rights
for

post-conviction

this

Utah

Court

remedies
of

Appeal's

and

procedural

review

of

the

Appellant's Amended Appeal set forth correctly, properly and in a
timely manner
required

nearly

sixty

(60) days before the Respondent

to file his Brief, and states according

was

to William v.

Kullman, 722 P.2d 1048 (2d Cir.l 1983) and located in Rights of
Prisoners, Gobert and Cohen ^3.00 (1989), which states:
H

[Appellate] courts should not summarily dismiss prisoner
petitions
containing
sufficient
allegations
of
constitutional violations .. . Moreover, due to the prose petitionees general lack of expertise, courts should
review [Coram Nobis] petitions with a lenient eye, allowing
borderline cases to proceed . . . If the writ of [Coram
Nobis] is to continue to have meaningful purpose, it must
be accessible not only to those with a strong legal
background or financial means to retain counsel, but also
to the mass of uneducated, unrepresented prisoners."
Therefore, this court is not in want of jurisdiction as asserted
by the Respondent when utilizing the above entitled case law and the
Constitution of Utah Art I Sec. 11, that clearly declares:
W

A11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any
-17-

civil cause to which he is a party."
Hence, the jurisdictional question of this Court must be resolved in
favor of the Appellant, and in favor of the Appellant's Amended
correct Record on Appeal, for which the Respondent's objections have
been duly noted, without merit or force, of any kind, since nothing
is controverted on the Appellant's correct Record on Appeal, which
was properly filed and served on November 20, 1989.

The Appellant

objects to the Respondent's wild-eyed, bald assertions, i.e., of the
properly noticed supplemental proceedings, and he did not answer the
questions over the phone as stated, "At that time he stated he did
not own these items any more and did not know where they were."
The second portion of the question . . . "if so, were such
actions in accordance with law?
The Respondent asserts, "The Execution and Writ of Restitution
could be and were issued immediately."

Thus giving the Respondent

the alleged right, during the Appellant's published absence in
violation of the Appellant's, his spouse's and his children's rights,
Utah Judicial Code 78-36-2(2) (App-31A), 78-36-9 (App-33) to break
into the Appellant's appropriate and timely paid amortization rentpaid storage unit facilities, in violation of the Constitution of the
United States 4th Amendment (App-32) declaring that the Appellant,
his spouse, and his children have no Constitutional rights, or
property protection rights even if the unauthorized clerk-signed
court order was valid against the Appellant, whereby rummaging and
pilfering occurred under the court-ordered guise of justice with no
accountability, which should be required by some court of this land.
Who cares?

Let us move to Russia, or Nazi Germany where the courts

and the police do as they please, to hell with the rights of the
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citizens! Who protects citizen rights in Utah anyway? The Appellant
has not seen all of his property since June 19, 1989!
The Respondent further asserts, "the Defendant could not have
lawfully removed any of the property, so he was not damaged by any
failure to remove those locks."

When was the last time that cut

locks did not constitute damage, or the forcible detainer to exempt
property occur as damages, since the Appellant's locks cannot be
reused after being cut with bolt cutters, nor can the Appellant's
exempt business property (spare parts and repair manual) be used to
operate his business when locked up and now sold?

Furthermore,

proper accounting of property could have been made, properly removing
the specific family property clearly identified by names on each box,
e.g.,

Saneh's,

Willie's,

Micah's,

Courtney's,

and

Bill's

and

appropriate Exempt Property allowances if that was their intention.
No there was no intention of any kind to allow this family any
property protection rights (Exempt Property) plunder and rob with the
court and the police protection.
this Sovereign State of Utah.

That is what it is all about, in

Protect our local businesses so they

will invest in Utah, but plunder the citizens who make them go,
especially those who have moved in from out of state with their
family household goods stored in them.
they

deserve; show

them who's boss!

Give them the welcome that
To hell with

the

tenant

protection laws.
The Judge corrected his alleged error, after communications with
the

opposing

council, and

the

officiating

sheriff's

office, a

violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, see 7 Am Jur
2d Attorneys at Law,

§ 42, "Violation of this prohibition or of a

similar bar rule, has been held to warrant disciplinary action."

Will Utah enforce or perform disciplinary action?
The Respondent asserts without any real- property accounting
clearly marked on each specific box noted as (full or empty) on the
purported sale (AR at 2B and 7), HAs to property not belonging to
him, that would not seem to be a defense • . . cannot be circumvented
merely by having someone other than the owner contract for the
storage.M
The law in Utah is well settled on that issue of exempt
propertyf which if observed by the Respondent would have yielded an
appropriate inquiry, interrogatory, or some attempted compliance with
the laws of this Sovereign State of Utah (App-38 and 39).
example,

For

(App-3) household goods and (AR at 2B and 7) which states:

"Two couches included an early American couch and a white couch . .
• assorted dressers, one with a mirror. The hutch was a china hutch,
a nine-piece dinette set—[solid cherry valued to nearly $6,000]—
assorted boxes"—which included 2 sets of china and a tea set. One
set of china was a twelve place-setting with extra platters, serving
dishes,

pitcher—Noritake,

valued

to

nearly

$2,000—crystal,

silverware, and many, many other items not listed on the professed
sale sheet, perhaps stolen before the sale, during the Appellant's
published absence so as not to be discovered by the Appellant.
Obviously, these are women's items, which should be protected by the
Constitution of Utah (App-39). They were not! If the Appellant had
a house, wouldn't these items be appropriate in a house instead of
storage?

Poor invalid Respondent logic!

There was no circumvention intended.

It is a fact of life that

household goods include all members of the household, not just the
contracting, unemployed, impoverished father. Each member has items
-20-

they planned for; each struggling through honest hard work# paying
with

cash

to acquire

for

their

benefit

and use, at

their

own

discretion of time, not at the whims of Mr. Steven J. Nelson who
arrogantly decides when and who can have access to their property
when he determines and asserts that someone is in default.

Thus,

locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors without the
proper statutory enforcement procedures, attempting to extort more
cash or lose their property.

For example, tenants do not need to

fear or make those kinds of decisions month after month at the whines
and whims of the landlord. They must have undisturbed access to come
and go as they please without the interference, whimsical policies,
and befuddled actions of the landlord under the complained of guise,
i.e., mistakes yielding a defense whereby the local, verbal telephone
w

Cartel H for the establishment of rent rates can be implemented with

court-ordered

approval

and

immediate

enforcement

in

stripping

families of their life-long possessions earned and paid for with cash
from honest hard work.

Will this Court protect this family?

Do

individuals have rights in Utah?
The Respondent asserts:
Notwithstanding the Appellant's notice of appeal, the
Appelllant's signed warning, property bond (App-1 and 40)
the personal service of a copy of the Extraordinary Writ
Case No. 890455, relied upon by the Appellant in trying to
protect against the Respondent's asserted claims against
his family's household property until a trial or some sort
of resolution to the untried, adjudged, decreed-SummaryJudgment claims of the Respondent could be effectively
challenged.
N

Not only does the delay in claiming an exemption bar defendant

from claiming error, but it indicates that in all likelihood, nothing
was sold that was exempt."

This is
-21-

preposterous.

The Appellant

claims error, lack of knowledge, extreme emotional distress, and if
known

at

the

time,

would

have

prevented

the

judgment

sale.

Consequently, this allows the appropriate legal remedy which is now
available that must apply, i.e., the Writ of Coram Nobis.
M

The purpose of the writ of coram nobis is to bring before
the court rendering the judgment matters of fact which, if
known at the time the judgment was rendered, would
presumably have prevented its rendition."
American Law Reports, Annotated, 58 ALR 1286.
The law in Utah has established:
11

It is essential to the availability of the remedy of coram
nobis . • . that the mistake of fact relied upon for relief
was unknown to the applicant at the time of the trial, and
could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been
discovered by him in time to have been presented to the
court, unless he was prevented from so doing by duress,
fear, or other sufficient cause, so that it was by no
negligence or other fault of his that the matter was not
made to appear at the former trial."
State v. Woodard, 160 P.2d 433 (Utah 1945).

Applying this rule to

the case at bar the Appellant utilized all his diligent means,
notwithstanding

his

lack

of

knowledge,

the

emotional

distress

resulting from breaking and entering into his property during his
published absence, also the Respondent's adamant trespassing claims
upon the Appellant's return July 11, 1989, without any real property
accounting exempt or otherwise (R at 31).

The numerous, ignored

motions written day after day well documented and noted by the
Respondent's shopping list of citations, and of course, the timely
appeal with the appropriate written and signed warnings, should
render to the Appellant the appropriate right and valid claim of
"Coram

Nobis", in demanding

appropriate

Exempt

Property

claims

against the Respondent's subterfuge of self serving excuses utilized
to unlawfully

strip this man and his family of their
-22-

life-time

accumulated possessions, paid for with cash for the only lawful claim
of $400 in cash.
as

properly

The Respondent is clearly liable to the Appellant

noticed

(App-1)

and

full

property

restitution

is

required, plus the other damages caused by their unlawful fraudulent
acts.

Hence, the Respondent's actions were not in accordance with

law, and their violent disrespect and breach of the law cannot be
justified by any known means.

Furthermore, examples should be made

of the Respondents in order to send a clear message to all of the
self storage facilities in the State of Utah, who rely upon similar
tactics ensuring that this State of Utah will not tolerate to any
degree the fraudulent, disrespectful practices now employed in the
local, verbal telephone "Cartel" for rent-rates, and tenant lock-up
procedures,

utilized

to

enforce

whimsical

policies,

self-help

procedures, alleged mistakes, or whatever against the individual
tenants, who rely upon implied covenants, written contracts, payment
notices,

for

the performance

responsibilities.

of

their

duties, obligations

and

What manner of Judges and men are ye that would

sit on your hands and ignore the Appellant's Amended correct record
on Appeal for the unlawful collection of $400 in cash.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent's failure to appropriately object or controvert
with any facts or case law the Appellant's numbered

issues one

through twelve renders irrefutable valid claims by the Appellant
against the Respondent for which great damage has been suffered, is
being suffered, and may continue to be suffered if full redress is
not

available

to the Appellant

immediately.

Consequently, the

Appellant's counterclaim, and the appropriate authority to amend,
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must

be granted

along

with

the Respondent's

requirement

to pay

advanced attorney fees whereby the Appellant can obtain legal counsel
for the appropriate legal prosecution of the wrongful tortious acts
taken

by

the Respondent

unlawfully

against

the Appellant.

The

Appellant affirmatively moves this Court for summary disposition of
these matters in favor of the Appellant immediately!
The Appellant has appropriately controverted the Respondent's
numbered issues one through three whereby the Respondent's adamantly
requested Summary Judgment Affirmance must not be rendered by this
Court.

This Court's

responsible actions would

include

but not

limited to sending an order to the American Fork Circuit Trial Court
of Utah County reversing the unenforceable claims of the Respondent,
directing further appropriate Appellant claims to the District Court
of

Utah

County

for

the

Appellant's

immediate

prosecution

and

enforcement of his counterclaim and amended counterclaim, and with
all costs to be paid by the Respondent, including but not limited to
full property restitution immediately; disciplinary actions against
the judges, sheriffs, court clerks and the moving Attorney would also
be appropriate at this time.
Respectfully submitted

William L. Echols, Pro-Se
Defendant and Appellant
733 North 800 West
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 377-0705
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Reply Brief was mailed to Lynn P. Heward #1479f Attorney
for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84117 on this
/Jx£
day of
VihAviaM
/ 1990, with full postage attached thereon. The
sum of three copies, as agreed.

William L. Echols, Pro-Se
Defendant and Appellant
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FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

# ^ < ^
'\t?j**

William L. Echols,

)

Petitioner,

)
)
v*
)
)
Fourth Circuit Court, State of )
Utah, Utah County, American
)
Fork Department,
)

of lh« Court

iwbCQuiitfAppeaii
ORDER DENYING
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
Case No. 890455-CA

Respondents.
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied.
Petitionor William L. Echols has an adequate and sufficient
remedy for any alleged error by way of an appeal and posting a
supercedeas bond. See R. Utah Ct. App. 3; Utah R. Civ. P.
62(d).
Furthermore, petitioner does not request any specific form
of relief, or show that he will suffer irreparable harm absent
such relief and the judgment creditor will not be prejudiced.
Petitioner has also failed to adequately inform this Court as
to the nature of the judgment entered by the trial court or its
ruling which petitioner challenges.
The petition is denied.
DATED this

IS—

day of July, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

*

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
American Fork Investors, a
California imited partnership,
dba American Self Storage,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

ORDER DENYING
MOTIONS
Case No* 890461-CA

William L. Echols,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant's motions for -directed verdict," "new trial" and
to "amend appellant's counterclaim" are considered by this
court to be, in substance, a motion for summary reversal under
R. Utah Ct. App. 10. Said motion is hereby denied and all
issues are reserved for plenary consideration of the appeal.

DATED this

/ ^ d day
;
of August, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Norman H. Jaclraon, Judge

